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RESPONSE

WHAT IS LOCALIST JUDGING
AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?

PAUL A. D ILLER†
In response to Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. P A .
L. R EV . 897 (2013).
Judges are local oﬃcials too, Ethan Leib helpfully reminds us in his
thought-provoking Article, Localist Statutory Interpretation.1 Like state court
judges in our federal system, local judges—a category deﬁned by Leib to
include only elected jurists2—may play a special role in interpreting both
state and local law. Ultimately, Leib concludes that this role is a highly
constrained one. He is comfortable endorsing local judges’ reliance on local
values (though only “in a narrow band of hard cases”)3 in large part because
state courts and legislatures remain available to overrule decisions that
unduly infringe on state interests.4 As an endorsement of “localism,” Leib’s
is most tepid.
But a tepid endorsement of localist judging is probably suﬃcient for even
the most avid proponents of localism. After all, it is the process of local
government itself—e.g., attending city council meetings, running for oﬃce—
that matters most to communitarians, and, except for the occasional decision
about local government procedure, it is likely that judges can do little to aﬀect
this process positively or negatively. While some communitarians focus on
† Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. I thank Jennifer Evert
for reviewing a draft of this Response.
1 Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. P A . L. R EV . 897 (2013).
2 See id. at 903-04 (listing the common characteristics of “local courts”).
3 Id. at 929.
4 Id. at 927-28.
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local juries as a key institution for educating and involving citizens,5 Leib’s
deﬁnition of local courts excludes lower trial courts of general jurisdiction,6
and thereby largely excludes courts with juries from his prescriptions.
For advocates of local government who extol its innovative power, a
tepid endorsement of localist judging is probably also ﬁne. Key policy
innovations are likely to come from either political actors (the city council
and mayor) or their delegates (local administrative agencies).7 To the extent
that local judges might “innovate” within the context of statutes or ordinances, their interpretive room is likely to be fairly narrow. Local judges
might ﬁnd more interpretive room within the common law, but Leib
devotes scant ink to that possibility.8 Regardless, even an innovative
common-law decision by a local judge can easily be reversed by a higherlevel state judge, provided that an appeal is taken. When there is no appeal,
which is more common in cases that receive little attention, it is hard to see
how a local judge’s decision matters much beyond the case in question. Of
course, a litigant’s life might be greatly aﬀected, which is no small thing, but
one would expect there to be little interpretive diﬀusion.9
Assuming, however, that local judges can ﬁnd some interpretive room
within which to import local concerns, serious questions remain about the
prospect of localist judging. First, how much substantive diﬀerence can we
expect to see between a local judge’s viewpoint and that of a state judge?
Little, Leib’s examples suggest. He cites a municipal court judge in Lorain,
Ohio, who takes “employability” issues into account when sentencing
5 Alexis de Tocqueville, a prominent forerunner of communitarian thought, extolled the
American jury as a “free school” that educates citizens on the law and self-governance in a
democracy. See A LEXIS DE T OCQUEVILLE, D EMOCRACY IN A MERICA 252-53 (J.P. Mayer &
Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1848) (“I do not know whether a
jury is useful to the litigants, but I am sure it is very good for those who have to decide the case. I
regard it as one of the most eﬀective means of popular education at society’s disposal.”). For a
more recent incarnation of this view, see, for example, Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as
Democratic Practice, 89 V A. L. R EV. 311, 345-50 (2003), which argues that “[t]he American jury is
the quintessential deliberative democratic body.”
6 Leib, supra note 1, at 903; see also Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64
STAN. L. R EV. 1109, 1157 n.247 (2012) (noting that municipal courts generally do not use juries).
7 See generally Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and
Structure, 91 W ASH . U. L. R EV . (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 7-25), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2240416 (providing examples of innovative public health regulation by
large municipalities).
8 See Leib, supra note 1, at 930 (noting that the focus of his Article is statutory interpretation
by local courts, not local court cases involving the common law).
9 As Leib notes, most local court decisions are not published. Id. at 899-900. It is hard for an
innovative legal interpretation to catch on when other judges, lawyers, and scholars cannot easily
access it. Id.
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criminal defendants.10 Are local employability concerns signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from statewide employability concerns? It is theoretically possible.
One can imagine a state in which unemployment in a particular city is oﬀ
the charts, far exceeding the statewide rate.11 In such a situation, the state’s
primary goal may be ensuring public safety, while the city may be more
concerned with reducing unemployment. But more common will be situations, like Ohio’s, where unemployment is presumably both a state and local
concern. The unemployment rate in the City of Lorain hovers over Ohio’s
statewide average by a percentage point or two.12 Does this diﬀerence really
aﬀect how a local judge performs his job? Should it?
The likelihood that any diﬀerence between the substantive interests
imported by “local judges” and those imported by “state judges” will be
negligible is further illuminated by horizontal comparison. The judges of a
state’s lowest-level courts of general jurisdiction are, according to Leib,
“state judges,”13 but the vast majority of these judges are elected14 (and
elected by an electorate that is a subset of the statewide voting pool).
Should we expect much, if any, diﬀerence between the popular concerns
that aﬀect, say, a Lorain municipal court judge and those that inﬂuence his
counterparts on the Ohio Court of Common Pleas (who sit less than nine
miles away in Elyria)? The former is elected by the voters of Lorain city;15
the latter are elected by the voters of Lorain County,16 which includes
Lorain city.17 In other instances, the electoral overlap is more complete: the
10
11

Id. at 908-09.
See, e.g., Mike Wilkinson, Nearly Half of Detroit’s Workers Are Unemployed, D ET. N EWS,
Dec. ��, ����, at �A, ��A (noting that Detroit’s oﬃcial and “unoﬃcial” unemployment rates were
27% and 44.8%, respectively, as compared to Michigan rates of 12.6% and 20.9%).
12 Compare, e.g., Letter from Ronald L. Mantini, Auditor, City of Lorain, to Lorain City
Council (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.cityoﬂorain.org/ﬁles/documents/ﬁles/�-21-11pkt_
1289.pdf (showing City of Lorain unemployment rates between January 2009 and December 2010
based on statistics provided by the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services), with Ohio
Unemployment Rate, Seasonally Adjusted, G OOGLE P UBLIC D ATA, http://www.google.com/
publicdata/explore?ds=z1ebjpgk2654c1_ (follow “Unemployment rate” hyperlink; then follow
“Ohio” hyperlink; then adjust graph timespan to January 2009—December 2010).
13 See Leib, supra note 1, at 904 (classifying lower trial courts of general jurisdiction as part of
the “state, rather than the local, political system”).
14 See Ruthann Robson, Judicial Review and Sexual Freedom, 30 U. H AW . L. R EV . 1, 16-17
n.102 (2007) (noting that of the 8500 state trial court judges nationwide, only 24% are appointed).
15 Court Oﬃcials, CITYOFLORAIN.ORG, http://www.cityoﬂorain.org/municipal_court/court_
oﬃcials (last visited June ��, ����).
16 About the Court of Common Pleas, L ORAIN C OUNTY C OURT OF C OMMON P LEAS ,
http://courtofcommonpleas.loraincounty.us (last updated June 3, 2013).
17 The county’s population is roughly ﬁve times that of Lorain city. Compare State and County
Quickfacts: Lorain County, Ohio, U.S. C ENSUS B UREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
39/39093.html (last revised Mar. 11, 2013) (noting a population of 301,356 as of April 2010), with
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exact same pool of voters elects both “local” judges and “state” trial court
judges.18 While Leib hints that state court judges should serve state, rather
than local, concerns,19 to the extent that lower-level state court judges’ views
are aﬀected by electoral pressure, expecting fealty to the state alone seems
unrealistic. The electoral pressures that inﬂuence local judges, therefore, are
likely quite similar to those that inﬂuence their state court counterparts, at
least at the trial court level.
A recent case illustrates this point: the legal challenge to New York
City’s cap on the portion size of sugar-sweetened drinks, which is more
popularly, and inaccurately, known as the “soda ban.”20 The plaintiﬀs—a
consortium of business owners, a labor union, and industry associations—
alleged that the City’s Board of Health exceeded its delegated powers in
promulgating a regulation that the Board lacked legal authority to adopt.21
In raising their claims, the plaintiﬀs relied in part on the state constitution,
but also invoked state and local law.22 The suit was ﬁled in the Supreme
Court of New York, New York County—the trial court of general jurisdiction in Manhattan and, by Leib’s deﬁnition, a state court. Justice Milton
Tingling invalidated the Board’s rule, largely agreeing with the plaintiﬀs’
claim that the Board had exceeded its delegated authority.23 Given that
State and County Quickfacts: Lorain (City), Ohio, U.S. C ENSUS B UREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/3944856.html (last revised Jan. 10, 2013) (noting a
population of 64,097 as of the same date).
18 This is particularly so where the borders of a county, the usual unit upon which state trial
court divisions are based, are coextensive with those of a large city, as in the case of Philadelphia. See
PA. CONST. art. V, § 5 (“There shall be one court of common pleas for each judicial district . . . .”);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 901(a) (West 2013) (declaring the ﬁrst judicial district to consist of the
“City and County of Philadelphia”); see also PA. CONST. art. V, § 6(c) (establishing a municipal court
in Philadelphia).
19 See Leib, supra note 1, at 925 (arguing that more fully integrating local judiciaries into the
state judiciary reduces the likelihood of localist judging, presumably because “state” judges are
more likely to serve state interests).
20 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013).
21 Veriﬁed Article �� & Declaratory Judgment Petition at �, N.Y. Statewide Coal., No.
653584/12 (Oct. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Portion Cap Petition].
22 The prominent issues of local law in the portion-cap case are questions of charter, rather
than ordinance, interpretation. See id. at 25-28 (arguing that the New York City Charter does not
authorize the Board of Health to “engage in the unprecedented act of policy-making at issue
here”). Presumably, Leib’s analysis would treat charter interpretation as similar to ordinance
interpretation, although perhaps not, given that a charter, as a city’s foundational governing
document, may be more analogous to a constitution than a statute.
23 N.Y. Statewide Coal., No. 653584/12, slip op. at 35-36. On July 30, 2013, just prior to the
publication of this Response, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York aﬃrmed
the trial court’s order. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
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Justice Tingling eventually faces an election before Manhattan voters,24 his
decision may have been just as inﬂuenced by “local” concerns as any local
court’s decision would have been. Even if lower-level state court elections,
especially in New York City, are notoriously uncompetitive,25 it seems
untenable to expect that they will function any diﬀerently from local court
elections for the purpose of discerning local popular sentiment. And insofar
as Justice Tingling credited local concerns in his decisionmaking,26 how
much should they diﬀer from state concerns? The state, presumably, has a
similar interest in reducing obesity. Indeed, given the amount of money
New York state spends on Medicaid as compared to New York City,27 the
state might be said to have a greater interest than the city in combating
obesity. Further, obesity rates are actually higher in New York state than in
New York City.28 On the other hand, the city is moving more aggressively
on many fronts to ﬁght obesity. Does this mean that obesity prevention is
more of a New York City value than a New York state value?
Indeed, the litigation against New York City’s portion cap rule also
illustrates the second major question raised by Leib’s invitation to local
judges to heed local concerns: if elected judges depart from the “trustee”
role, as envisioned by Leib,29 how should they discern the local concerns
of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 3880139 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep’t July
30, 2013).
24 See N.Y. C ONST . art. VI, § 6(c) (requiring justices of the supreme court to be chosen by
the electors of their judicial district, and setting their terms at fourteen years). To be sure, New
York Supreme Court justices’ fourteen-year terms are very long, even by judicial term standards.
See A M. JUDICATURE S OC’Y, JUDICIAL S ELECTION IN THE S TATES: A PPELLATE AND
G ENERAL JURISDICTION C OURTS (2013), available at http://www.judicialselection.com/
uploads/documents/Judicial_Selection_Charts_1196376173077.pdf (listing term lengths for judges
of state general jurisdiction courts).
25 See López Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 198-200 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting the lack of competition in New York Supreme Court races), rev’d, 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
26 Justice Tingling recognized the city’s interest in ﬁghting obesity, but did not distinguish
systematically the obesity-related harm to the city from that inﬂicted upon the state and nation as
a whole. See N.Y. Statewide Coal., No. 653584/12, slip op. at 7-� (“The health of its residents aﬀects
the economics of a town, village, city, state and nation.”).
27 See C ITIZENS B UDGET C OMM ’ N , A P OOR W AY TO P AY FOR M EDICAID : W HY N EW
Y ORK S HOULD E LIMINATE L OCAL F UNDING FOR M EDICAID 5 (Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.cbcny.org/sites/default/ﬁles/REPORT_Medicaid_��������.pdf (noting that for ﬁscal
year 2012, New York’s counties—ﬁve of which constitute New York City—would pay 13% of the
state’s total contribution to Medicaid, while the state government would fund the remainder).
28 See Sewell Chan, Data Say Manhattan’s Slim; But the Bronx? A Bit Chubby, N.Y. T IMES ,
July ��, ����, at A�� (noting that Manhattan’s obesity rate was signiﬁcantly below the state
average, and that obesity rates in three of the other four New York City boroughs were just below
the state average).
29 See Leib, supra note 1, at 916-17 (explaining the “trustee” model of judging as one where
judges “are independent of public opinion and remain unaﬀected by the people’s demands”
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that Leib thinks may appropriately inform their decisionmaking? The
literature on the subject of elected judges acting as something other than
trustees has generally focused on state courts and, more speciﬁcally, on
judges using popular sentiment to interpret state constitutions.30 Leib
recognizes that lower-level judicial elections are likely to be poor vehicles
for discerning popular sentiment, given that they are notoriously uncompetitive aﬀairs that attract little voter interest.31 Despite this fact, and although
Leib disavows judges “tak[ing] opinion polls” to decide “diﬃcult statutory
cases,”32 he still endorses the notion that elections provide “meaningful
input” into local judges’ decisionmaking.33 But Leib appears to be thinking
mostly of cases in which local concerns stand in contrast to some potentially
contradictory state goal. Yet local concerns themselves may be quite
conﬂicting, as the New York City portion-cap case demonstrates.
If Justice Tingling had looked to poll numbers to discern the relevant
local concerns, he would have seen that most residents of New York City
(even Manhattan) opposed the portion cap rule.34 If, however, he had
looked to the views of local oﬃcials like Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who
championed the rule, he would have heard very diﬀerent concerns: the toll
obesity exacts on city residents’ health, particularly in lower-income communities and communities of color; the billions of dollars New York City
spends on Medicaid and on public hospitals; and the fact that soda exacerbates obesity, which adds to this ﬁnancial strain.35 If Justice Tingling had
credited the views of certain city council members, he might have heard
diﬀerent local opinions, such as how the rule would hurt certain businesses.36 In
(quoting Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. & Charles H. Sheldon, Voters in Judicial Elections: An Attentive
Public or an Uninformed Electorate?, 9 JUST. S YS. J. 23, 36 tbl.4 (1984))).
30 See, e.g., Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a
State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. R EV. 1629, 1655, 1659-74 (2010)
(assessing how “backlash risks and the capacity of state justices to assess in-state consequences”
aﬀect state constitutional decisions).
31 Leib, supra note 1, at 913-15.
32 Id. at 915.
33 Id. at 917.
34 Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, 60% in City Oppose Soda Ban, Calling It an
Overreach by Bloomberg, a Poll Finds, N.Y. T IMES, Aug. 23, 2012, at A19.
35 See Casey Neistat, Op-Docs, Soda Ban Explained, N.Y. T IMES , Sept. 9, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/10/opinion/soda-ban-explained.html?ref=nyregion (describing the
“soda ban” as a “small step toward a solution” to curbing obesity and its medical costs); see also
CITIZENS B UDGET C OMM’N, supra note 27, at 12, 13 tbl.2 (noting that New York City spent $4.6
billion on Medicaid in ﬁscal year ����).
36 See Portion Cap Petition, supra note 21, at 16-19 (citing objections to the rule from city
council members, local businesses, and consumer advocates). In assessing whether the Board had
exceeded its delegated powers, Justice Tingling brieﬂy discussed the city council’s action—or,
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other words, an answer to the epistemic question of which local concerns are
relevant and may legitimately inform statutory (or ordinance, or charter)
interpretation is far from clear.37 Leib has invited elected judges to enter this
thicket, but he has not yet provided a clear way through the brush.
That Leib’s analysis provokes as many questions as it answers proves
that he has drawn attention to an area ripe for further exploration. By
calling attention to localist judging, Leib has introduced broader questions
about how and from whom judges ought to discern community values.38
This is an issue that also plays out in the context of judicial elections at the
state level, as well as in the context of deciding preemption cases, in which
judges must determine whether a local ordinance conﬂicts with a statewide
concern.39 In shifting the focus of intrastate power struggles to local courts,
Leib has drawn our attention to a heretofore under-appreciated actor.
Continued attention to local judges—and localist judging—can only enrich
the broader debate about vertical distribution of power in state and local
government law.

Preferred Citation: Paul A. Diller, Response, What is Localist Judging and
Why Does It Matter?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 331 (2013), http://www.
pennlawreview.com/responses/8-2013/Diller.pdf.

more aptly, inaction—with respect to regulating sugar-sweetened beverages. N.Y. Statewide Coal.
of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No.
653584/12, slip op. at 30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013) (“The New York City Council and New
York Legislature have continuously decided not to pass legislation targeting the consumption of
sugar-sweetened beverages . . . .”).
37 With respect to state judges, Leib has wrestled with this issue in some depth in prior
work. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U.
C HI. L. R EV. 1215, 1237-�� (����) (discussing how methods of judicial selection inﬂuence judges’
approach to statutory interpretation).
38 As noted earlier, supra note 5, there is a connection here to the literature that looks to local
juries as fonts of community values. See Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial
Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 408-14 (2009) (characterizing the right to a jury trial as a community
right); Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 E MORY L.J. 1331, 1375-87 (2012)
(arguing that juries “inject community norms into the legal system”).
39 See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. R EV . 1113, 1140-57 (2007) (examining the
intrastate preemption doctrine).

